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Abstract
Cloud computing has become indispensable in today’s com-
puter landscape. The flexibility it offers for customers as
well as for providers has become a crucial factor for large
parts of the computer industry. Virtualization is the key tech-
nology that allows for sharing of hardware resources among
different customers. The controlling software component,
called hypervisor, provides a virtualized view of the com-
puter resources and ensures separation of different guest vir-
tual machines. However, this important cornerstone of cloud
computing is not necessarily trustworthy or bug-free. To mit-
igate this threat AMD introduced Secure Encrypted Virtu-
alization, short SEV, which transparently encrypts a virtual
machines memory.
In this paper we analyse to what extend the proposed fea-
tures can resist a malicious hypervisor and discuss the trade-
offs imposed by additional protection mechanisms. To do so,
we developed a model of SEV’s security capabilities based
on the available documentation as actual silicon implemen-
tations are not yet on the market.
We found that the first proposed version of SEV is not
up to the task owing to three design shortcomings. First the
virtual machine control block is not encrypted and handled
directly by the hypervisor, allowing it to bypass VM memory
encryption by executing conveniently chosen gadgets. Sec-
ondly, the general purpose registers are not encrypted upon
vmexit, leaking potentially sensitive data. Finally, the control
over the nested pagetables allows a malicious hypervisor to
closely monitor the execution state of a VM and attack it
with memory replay attacks.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing has been one of the most prevalent trends
in the computer industry in the last decade. It offers clear ad-
vantages for both customers and providers. Customers can
easily deploy multiple servers and dynamically allocate re-
sources according to their immediate needs. Providers can
ver-commit their hardware and thus increase the overall uti-
lization of their systems. The key technology that made this
possible is virtualization, it allows multiple operating sys-
tems to share hardware resources. The hypervisor is respon-
sible for providing temporal and spatial separation of the
virtual machines (VMs). However, besides these advantages
virtualization also introduced new risks.
Customers who want to utilize the infrastructure of a
cloud provider must fully trust the cloud provider. Especially
the hypervisor is a critical component provided by the cloud
hoster as it has full control over the guest VMs. A malicious
or compromised hypervisor can read and write the entire
guest memory. This affects the integrity and confidentiality
of the customer’s secrets and the integrity of the customer’s
services. Security issues might lead to a full breach of the
hypervisor through a hosted VM; bugs of such severity have
been reported for all most commonly used hypervisors [10–
13, 16]. As a single cloud instance often hosts multiple
guest VMs from different customers such security issues
allow a malicious tenant to steal confidential data from other
customers.
Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [15] and AMD’s
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) [19] are industry’s
answer to these threats. They extend the features of the pro-
cessor to reduce the impact of a malicious, higher privileged
software in regards to the confidentiality and integrity of
lower privileged software. SGX enables the customer to cre-
ate a secure enclave where special code can be executed in
a trusted environment that cannot be tampered with by the
hypervisor or the operating system. SGX achieves this by
requiring the customer to identify the security sensitive parts
of a program and to alter them such that these parts are ex-
ecuted in an SGX enclave. SEV, on the other hand, allows a
customer to encrypt the unaltered VM’s memory so that the
hypervisor is not able to inspect its data. The recent addition
of SEV Encrypted State (SEV-ES) extends the cryptographic
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protection of the guest VM to its control state and its gen-
eral purpose registers. As can be seen from the AMD SEV
whitepaper [19]:
,,SEV technology is built around a threat model where
an attacker is assumed to have access to not only exe-
cute user level privileged code on the target machine,
but can potentially execute malware at the higher
privileged hypervisor level as well. The attacker may
also have physical access to the machine including
to the DRAM chips themselves. In all these cases,
SEV provides additional assurances to help protect
the guest virtual machine code and data from the at-
tacker.”
The advantage of a solution such as AMD’s SEV is that it
can be easily adopted by customers because no changes to
their existing application software are needed.
While the research community has examined Intel’s SGX
[9, 26, 28], AMD’s SEV has not been subject to scientific re-
search so far. It is thus unclear what level of protection SEV
can provide. In this paper, we have a first look at the up-
coming AMD SEV technology based on publicly available
documentation. We identify possible design issues that can
be leveraged by a malicious hypervisor to compromise the
guest VM. To that end, we implement in total three proof
of concept attacks on a currently available system. For the
construction of the attacks, we bear in mind not only the re-
strictions an AMD SEV-enabled system imposes, but also
evaluate how the initial SEV design could be hardened with-
out sacrificing further guest transparency or impacting cloud
maintenance operation. However we show that even an at-
tacker restricted to basic resource management capabilities,
is still able to gain access to the protected guest system.
Our contributions are:
- We show how a malicious hypervisor can coerce the
guest to leak arbitrary memory content and perform ar-
bitrary write operations on encrypted memory.
- We describe how to completely disable any memory en-
cryption configured by the tenant.
- We implement a replay attack that uses captured login
data to gain access to the target system by solely exploit-
ing resource management features of a hypervisor.
For the first two attacks we base our evaluation on the initial
design of SEV without the optional SEV-ES extension. The
third attack considers the protection of the guest state and
general purpose register, as it might be implemented by
SEV-ES. As processors featuring SEV are not available yet,
it is unclear whether our results will apply to real silicon
implementations or future versions of SEV. We therefore
emphasize that we did not break AMD SEV itself but rather
evaluated the design issues present in the documentation
with respect to their capability to protect a guest VM against
a malicious or compromised hypervisor.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2
we give an overview on x86 virtualization and AMD SEV.
We evaluate the security of the protection mechanisms pro-
posed by SEV in Section 3 and discuss our attack model in
Section 4. In Section 5 we present our attack. We discuss
possible mitigations to our attack in Section 6. In Section 7
we evaluate alternative approaches to shield execution envi-
ronments from higher privileged adversaries and present re-
lated attacks under similar threat models. Finally, we discuss
future work in Section 8 and conclude our work in Section 9.
2. Background
In this section we first give a brief introduction to x86 vir-
tualization then we discuss the design of AMD’s SEV tech-
nology. This information by no means represents a complete
overview of these topics. The specification for AMD SVM
and AMD SEV are however publicly available. Thus, we re-
fer the interested reader to [2, 4].
2.1 x86 Virtualization Technologies
In 2005, both Intel (VT-x) [25] and AMD (SVM) [1] in-
troduced hardware extensions to their x86 processors that
added a higher privileged mode to the existing ring 0 to ring
3 privilege levels. This new mode, called host mode, com-
prises another set of the privilege rings 0 to 3 and is higher
privileged than the non-host mode, called guest mode. The
host mode is intended to host the hypervisor whereas the
guest VM usually executes in the non-host mode. To make
use of these extensions, a hypervisor, running in the host
mode, uses a special instruction, vmrun, to switch the CPU
to the guest mode. This instruction takes the address of a
control structure as a single argument in the register rAX.
This control structure, called vmcb, contains the guest state,
entry controls (pending virtual interrupts) and exit controls.
Prior to the initial start of the guest, the hypervisor config-
ures the vmcb and initializes the general purpose registers as
they are not part of the vmcb. Upon issuing the vmrun in-
struction, the CPU copies the values of the vmcb fields into
the respective hardware registers and starts execution of the
guest at the entry point defined in the vmcb. An event that is
flagged in the vmcb as such will lead to a vmexit with the
exit reason set in the vmcb. The hypervisor then handles the
exit accordingly.
While the original design of AMD SVM from 2005 al-
lowed a hypervisor to run multiple guests on a single CPU
without altering the guest OS, it lacked support to virtual-
ize memory efficiently. In 2008, AMD released a technol-
ogy called “nested-paging” [3] that enables a hypervisor to
virtualize memory in an efficient way. The traditional pag-
ing hierarchy was extended with another layer, the nested
layer. Instead of just translating from virtual to physical ad-
dresses, now the translation involves two steps. The guest
pagetable, maintained by the guest operating system, trans-
lates from guest virtual to guest physical addresses, whereas
the host pagetable translates from guest physical addresses
to physical addresses. This second translation step is fully
under control of the hypervisor.
2.2 Memory Management
KVM leverages nested page faults as an indicator for the
access load of a guest memory page. This information is
required to optimize tasks in which guest memory has to
be made temporarily unavailable, namely live migration,
memory snapshots, and memory overcommitment. Here we
give a brief overview of how KVM incorporates nested page
fault information in those tasks.
For live migration and memory snapshots, memory is
transferred incrementally. First, the current guest memory
content is copied without stopping the guest execution. This
memory snapshot is extended in later increments by memory
content that has been modified during the initial transfer.
Only if the estimated remaining transfer time falls below
a predefined threshold, the guest is stopped to transfer the
remaining pages. To identify modified pages since the last
transfer, QEMU instructs KVM to record a list of all pages
that have been written to by the guest. To that end, KVM
removes the write access permission from all guest memory
pages and restores it only after registering the preceding
write access fault.
Further, guest memory is subject to Linux standard mem-
ory maintenance operations. Based on process page faults,
memory is allocated lazily and can be swapped out to disk
if unused, thereby enabling memory overcommitment. To
do so the nested pagetable entries for the respective pages
are removed, therefore causing a nested pagetable violation
if the guest tries to access them. KVM handles the nested
page fault, restores the page from the swap file and recreates
the nested pagetable entries along with the pagetable entries
connecting to the QEMU userland process.
A similar method is used to lazily allocate memory for the
guest upon initial startup. To associate a memory region with
the guest QEMU allocates a chunk of memory and informs
KVM of the virtual memory area. Until a page is accessed
no host- or nested pagetable entries are created other than
those required for the guest kernel image and initial runtime.
If the guest accesses any additional page a nested page fault
will be triggered and handled by KVM as described in the
previous paragraph.
2.3 Virtual devices
While the hardware virtualization extensions provide CPU
and memory virtualization, handling device virtualization is
the obligation of the hypervisor.
On x86, devices are accessed by either IO ports, mem-
ory mapped registers or by a combination of both. Accessing
IO port based devices requires the use of special instructions
(e.g. IN or OUT) whereas memory-mapped devices can be ac-
cessed using normal instructions (e.g. mov). If the device it-
self requires the CPU to handle an event, it raises an interrupt
which diverts the control flow of the CPU to a specific inter-
rupt handling routine. To improve the overall performance,
data can also be transferred without the involvement of the
CPU. The device reads or writes directly to or from main
memory, allowing the CPU to perform other tasks in paral-
lel. The technology is commonly referred to as DMA (Direct
Memory Access). To protect against unauthorized accesses
from DMA capable devices, an IOMMU can confine devices
to only access configured memory regions. Three common
approaches to handling devices in a virtualized environment
are passthrough, emulation, and para-virtualization.
Passthrough Using this method, one VM has exclusive
access to a hardware device. If the device provides only
a memory-mapped interface, the corresponding memory
pages are mapped into the guest address space via the nested
pagetable. In the case of IO ports, the vmcb allows config-
uring which IO ports are accessible directly by a guest. If a
commodity device without special virtualization extensions
is passed through, only a single guest can use this device.
Some devices can also be configured to provide ,,virtual
functions”, through which the same device can be used by
multiple guests. An IOMMU is usually required to contain
DMA access within configured memory regions.
Emulation The hypervisor can present a virtual device to
the guest. It sets up the nested pagetable with a hole in the
address space where the guest expects the memory-mapped
device. When the guest now accesses these memory ranges
to interact with the device, this will trap into the hypervi-
sor. To perform memory access on behalf of the guest the
hypervisor must know the value that should be written. The
vmcb will contain the fault address, i.e. the location where
the data should be written, but not the value itself. The value
is usually stored in a general purpose register1. The hypervi-
sor must parse the instruction that caused the fault to iden-
tify the register holding the value. As the instruction pointer
locating this instruction holds a guest-virtual address, the
hypervisor must first traverse the guest pagetable to get the
guest-physical address of the instruction before it can parse
the instruction. As traversing the pagetable imposes a severe
bottleneck for device emulation, AMD added decode assists
that provide the register location of the value in case of a
nested page fault.
Para-virtualization The performance for accessing virtual
devices can be enhanced using para-virtualization. Here the
hypervisor does not emulate an existing device but provides
an interface of an artificial device to the guest that has no
corresponding hardware device. This has the advantage that
the hypervisor and the guest can agree on an interface that
encompasses the peculiarities of the hypervisor and guest
communication. For example instead of trapping writes to
1 There are instructions like rep ins movs that take the target and source
address as pointers in registers, but those are not commonly used when
accessing memory-mapped devices.
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Figure 1: QEMU/KVM architecture
certain memory areas, the guest can use special instructions
that cause a trap into the hypervisor. This mechanism is
called a hypercall. In contrast to memory accesses, these hy-
percalls do not cause a pagetable walk by the memory man-
agement unit. This can increase the performance of these
virtual devices but requires drivers to be adapted to the hy-
percall interface.
Device emulation is crucial for providing basic VM func-
tionality, like network connectivity, for the guest owner. Be-
sides device emulation, features that are the sole responsi-
bility of the cloud providers, such as host memory man-
agement and migration, are mandatory in a cloud environ-
ment. Given that substantial modification of the deployed
VM’s code base goes against customer interest and device
passthrough does not scale to larger cloud infrastructures,
this draws a lower bound on the limitations imposed on hy-
pervisor control over guest VMs, i.e., host memory manage-
ment demands that the hypervisor has control over the sec-
ond level page translations.
2.4 Linux KVM
In the previous paragraph, we explained AMD’s virtualiza-
tion extensions. We now lay out how this technology is used
by the KVM hypervisor which is integrated with the Linux
kernel [20].
Virtualizing CPU and memory is not sufficient because
guest operating systems also need devices such as video out-
put, network or block devices. As a guest should not directly
interfere with the hardware devices itself, they must be ei-
ther multiplexed or emulated (see Section 2.3). While the
KVM hypervisor is responsible for controlling the execu-
tion of guest VMs, QEMU is leveraged to handle the device
virtualization. Figure 1a depicts the initial startup of a guest
VM in a KVM/QEMU setup.
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Figure 2: SEV-enabled QEMU/KVM architecture
First, QEMU reserves memory for the VM (Figure 1a 1©).
Then it copies the guest binaries into this reserved memory
(Figure 1a 2©). By using the /dev/kvm device node, the
KVM module of the Linux kernel is instructed to start a new
VM (Figure 1a 3©). KVM then sets up a vmcb data struc-
ture incorporating the information from QEMU and issues
the vmrun instruction to start the VM (Figure 1a 4©). The
processor now enters the guest mode, depicted in grey, and
starts execution at the entry point defined in the vmcb.
The runtime behaviour is shown in Figure 1b. Upon any
event that was configured in the vmcb to cause a vmexit,
the CPU leaves guest mode and enters host mode again
with a specific error code set in the vmcb (Figure 1b 1©).
The KVM module can then either handle the exit itself or,
in the case of, e.g., a memory-mapped IO operation to an
emulated device, can return to QEMU which then handles
the request (Figure 1b 2©). The emulated device can access
guest memory directly to mimic DMA memory transfers
(Figure 1b 3©). After the request was served, QEMU calls
KVM again (Figure 1b 4©), which resumes execution of the
VM in guest mode (Figure 1b 5©).
2.5 AMD SEV
As indicated in Figure 1, the hypervisor has full access to
guest memory while the CPU is in host mode. This demands
that a cloud customer must trust not only the employees of
the cloud provider but also the integrity of the hypervisor.
Bugs such as [10–13, 16] can be used by a malicious
tenant to attack the hypervisor itself and thereby gain access
to assets of other tenants residing on the same physical
machine.
SEV protects guest memory via encryption. The guest
specific memory encryption key will never be exposed to the
hypervisor. It is only accessed by a secure coprocessor and
the memory controller that handles the encryption and de-
cryption transparently. The coprocessor which was added to
SEV-enabled CPUs (the ,,Platform Security Processor” [19],
indicated as PSP in Figure 2a), handles key management and
is responsible for configuring the correct guest key within
the memory controller.
Figure 2 shows how the classical KVM architecture looks
on an SEV-enabled system. Like detailed in the previous
Section, QEMU communicates with the KVM module to
prepare the VM for launch (Figure 2a 1© to 3©). To en-
able SEV for the newly allocated VM it’s memory must
first be encrypted. The host kernel calls the coprocessor to
initiate the encryption of the VM memory using a three-
fold command sequence, LAUNCH START, LAUNCH UPDATE
and LAUNCH FINISH (Figure 2a 4©, 5© and 6©). By us-
ing this command sequence, the hypervisor ensures that
the firmware generates an encryption key unique to the
VM (LAUNCH START), encrypts the memory and records
a launch receipt of the VM used for remote attestation
(LAUNCH UPDATE and LAUNCH FINISH). After the encryp-
tion of guest memory is completed the firmware provides
the recipe to the hypervisor to be passed on to the customer.
This recipe includes measurements of the guest image and
platform authentication data, which allow the customer to
verify that the VM memory was encrypted and initialized
correctly. If a customer judges the recipe or the contained
measurements to be faulty, he can choose to withhold the
provisioning of secrets to the VM.
Each VM uses its unique cryptographic key that is loaded
by the secure processor when the corresponding VM is
scheduled. Once a guest enables paging, it can mark individ-
ual data pages as either shared or private by setting a phys-
ical address bit (the enCrypted- or C-bit) in its pagetable.
Memory pages marked as private are encrypted using AES
with the guest specific key and pages marked as shared are
either not encrypted or encrypted with the hypervisor key
and can thus be used to exchange data with the hypervisor.
The C-bit of the guest pagetables has precedence over the
C-bit of the hypervisor controlled second level pagetables to
secure the page protection configured by the guest VM. In
addition to the memory protection mechanism, AMD offers
tenants the ability to enforce guest policies. Policy configu-
ration includes amongst others the option to disable debug
capabilities of the hypervisor towards the guest VM.
Figure 2b shows the system configuration during runtime.
The secure coprocessor (PSP) is not shown, as it is used
mainly during VM startup. The steps composing the run-
time behaviour under SEV (Figure 2b 1©, 2©, 4© and 5©)
do not differ from the non-SEV configuration. This is due
to the fact, that cryptographic operations are handled trans-
parently by the memory controller, while the secure proces-
sor handles key management without the involvement of the
hypervisor or the VM. However to facilitate DMA memory
transfers (Figure 2b 3©) similar to a classical setup, the guest
is tasked to configure shared memory regions, which are ex-
empt from encryption.
2.6 SEV - Encrypted State
SEV - Encrypted State (SEV-ES) is an extension to SEV
that additionally encrypts the guest state, including the gen-
eral purpose register, using the guest specific encryption key.
When the CPU leaves the guest mode, all general purpose
registers, as well as the guest saved state, are encrypted. A
vmexit event is now classified as either an “Automatic Exit”
(AE) or a “Non-Automatic-Exit” (NAE) depending on the
exit reason. Any asynchronous event, e.g. an interrupt, is
classified as an AE. AE events do not require the hypervi-
sor to read the guest state, which can therefore be encrypted
by the secure processor. AES events, on the other hand,
are events that potentially require the hypervisor to read the
guest state. If such an event occurs, the control is not trans-
ferred to the hypervisor. Instead, a new exception is raised
in the guest, the “VMM Communication Exception” (#VC).
The exception handler of these exceptions in the guest can
now decide whether to provide the hypervisor with access
to the guest state, or not. To exchange data a shared mem-
ory region is used, called “Guest-Hypervisor Communica-
tion Block” (GHCB). Data to be shared with the hypervisor
must be copied to that memory region. After copying the
values to the GHCB, the guest executes vmgexit to transfer
control to the hypervisor. Nested page faults are usually AE
events, i.e., the hypervisor does not need to read guest state
to handle these events. Therefore there is no #VC exception
triggered in these cases. In order to allow the hypervisor to
provide emulated devices for the guest, the hypervisor can
enforce certain nested page faults to be NAE events. To do
so, the hypervisor sets a reserved bit in the nested pagetable.
Faults caused by accesses to these pages are treated as NAE
events, and instead of transferring control to the hypervisor,
a VC exception in the guest is raised.
3. AMD SEV Security Considerations
While guest memory is protected from direct hypervisor ac-
cess by encryption, other security-critical components are
not protected at all. By examining the AMD SEV documen-
tation [2, 19] and publicly available comments from AMD
employees [21], we found that for a system without SEV-
ES:
1. The general purpose registers are not encrypted upon a
vmexit [21].
2. The vmcb is subject to manipulation by the hypervi-
sor [21].
3. The hypervisor can access encrypted guest memory due
to the lack of memory authentication [2, 19].
Under a system, which also implements the SEV-ES ex-
tension only the third point remains valid.
General Purpose Registers Whenever the CPU switches
from guest mode to host mode, the general purpose registers
of the guest are exposed to the hypervisor. As the guest itself
cannot control when the CPU transfers to host mode, these
registers can contain potentially confidential data. If such an
exit occurs e.g. while the guest is generating an RSA key
pair, the key components might be exposed to the hypervisor.
VMCB As mentioned in Section 2.1, the vmcb is used to
control the execution and state of the guest. The vmcb is
therefore crucial to guest integrity and exposes the content
of privileged guest registers. Among these registers is the
instruction pointer of the guest which allows the hypervisor
to govern guest control flow.
Memory Authentication The memory is encrypted, but
it is otherwise not protected from access. This enables the
hypervisor to inject faults into the guest or to capture and
replay private guest memory.
Later sections will lay out how these design issues can be
leveraged by a malicious hypervisor to a) gain shell access
to a guest, b) read protected guest memory and c) fully re-
vert any memory protection configured by the tenant. While
SEV-ES successfully protects the general purpose registers
and the vmcb, the guest memory can still be accessed by the
hypervisor, though the hypervisor can only access encrypted
pages. This mitigates attack vectors b) and c). Still, as we
will show in later sections there is no easy way to prevent
a) without sacrificing guest transparency or impacting clas-
sic cloud functionality, such as migration and the memory
management features of the hypervisor.
4. Attack Model
In this section, we describe our attack model, which is based
on the AMD SEV security properties (detailed in Section 3).
We assume that a customer successfully deployed his VM
on an AMD SEV-enabled system. During startup, we also as-
sume that the hypervisor is uncompromised and compliant
with the AMD SEV specification [2]. This means the cus-
tomer was able to attest the correct setup of his VM using
the receipt provided by the hypervisor. From this point on
the VM is protected by AMD SEV. Neither the hypervisor
nor someone with physical access to the cloud infrastructure
is able to read the designated private memory regions of the
protected guest.
Then, during runtime, an attacker was able to compro-
mise the hypervisor, thereby gaining root access to the host
system. The described scenario is likely, as incidents of the
past show [10, 12, 13, 16]. We also assume that the attacker
has knowledge of the target system with regards to the ver-
sions of the kernel and userland processes. As the cloud
provider itself often provides the guest images, this is also
likely. We assume that the encryption scheme in use pro-
duces the same encrypted data if the input, key and host
physical address are identical, similar to other symmetric lin-
ear memory encryption schemes. Further, we require, that no
integrity check is performed on encrypted data, In addition
to that, we initially assume access to nested pagetables, vmcb
and guest register state, which we later restrict only to nested
pagetable access for the replay attack.
5. Attacks against Encrypted Virtualization
We now present three attacks against VMs under a compro-
mised hypervisor.
The first two attacks presented in Section 5.1 are directed
against the proposed design of SEV without the optional fea-
ture SEV-ES, which allows the hypervisor to extract and
control guest state through the unencrypted guest control
block and registers. Amongst other security concerns for the
tenant, this flaw can be used to decrypt guest memory in-
cluding the internal address mapping, as we will show in our
first attack in Section 5.1.1. Building upon this capacity we
describe in Section 5.1.2 how the memory protection config-
ured by the tenant can be deactivated, without notifying the
guest. After deactivation of memory protection further ex-
ploitation, like arbitrary code execution is trivial to execute
as the hypervisor now has full access to guest memory.
The third attack already takes the presence of SEV-ES
into account, which protects the integrity of the guest control
block and registers in the face of a malicious hypervisor. We
however show in Section 5.2 that protecting those structures
alone is not sufficient. If the hypervisor is in control over
guest memory allocations through nested paging, it can use
this capability to launch a replay attack. We prove this claim
by launching an attack against an OpenSSH server running
in the protected guest VM to gain access at potentially high
privilege levels.
5.1 Attacks based on exposed Guest State
In this section, we present two attacks against an encrypted
guest, facilitating hypervisor access to the guest control
block and registers. First, we describe a method to exploit
guest control flow to read and write arbitrary memory ar-
eas of a running guest in decrypted form. Based on this
primitive, we construct an advanced attack to disable guest
memory protection as documented in [2] altogether.
5.1.1 Accessing Protected Memory
Given a system which is capable of encrypting guest mem-
ory as described in [2], we now describe how a malicious
hypervisor can coerce an encrypted guest into leaking arbi-
trary memory content. The methods for reading and writing
protected guest memory are symmetric, therefore we restrict
this section to the description of the memory read primitive.
During guest execution, the memory of the active VM is
transparently decrypted by the memory controller. Memory
content which, in this state, is transferred into unencrypted
areas like the vmcb, registers or shared memory, will be ex-
mov edi , dword p t r [ rbx ]
h l t
Listing 1: Read Instruction Sequence
i n t n e w h a n d l e h l t ( s t r u c t vcpu∗ vcpu ) {
u64 r i p , e d i ;
r i p = r i p r e a d ( vcpu ) ;
i f ( r i p == DECRYPT HLT INS && d e c r y p t i n g ) {
e d i = r e g i s t e r r e a d ( vcpu , VCPU EDI ) ;
/ / p r o c e s s d e c r y p t e d da ta i n EDI . . .
r e g i s t e r w r i t e ( vcpu , VCPU RBX,
c u r r e n t a d d r ) ;
c u r r e n t a d d r += 0x4 ;
i f ( c u r r e n t a d d r < l a s t a d d r )
r i p w r i t e ( DECRYPT HLT INS ) ;
re turn 0 ;
} e l s e {
/ / ha nd l e normal h l t e x i t . . .
}
}
Listing 2: HLT Exit Handler
posed to the hypervisor whenever guest execution is inter-
rupted. Our attack induces an interruption of the guest exe-
cution, right after protected data has been transferred from
an attacker controlled memory location into an unencrypted
register. To divert guest control flow, we set the guest instruc-
tion pointer before guest re-entry to the guest virtual address
of a suitable instruction sequence. Shortly after the read in-
struction we force a vmexit to read the decrypted data from
the register.
The instruction sequence is required to end with a trap-
pable instruction and to contain an indirect memory read.
Listing 1 shows the sequence of instructions, which we used
to launch the attack. We extracted this sequence statically
from the guest kernel binary, for which we used a modified
tool for ropchain generation, called ROPGadget [18]. The
code snippet reads four bytes from guest memory into the
register eDI, before a vmexit is induced by the instruction
hlt. The malicious hypervisor can then conveniently take
the decrypted word from the general purpose register. List-
ing 2 shows the respective exit handler, which the hypervisor
could use to handle this particular hlt trap condition. To de-
crypt an arbitrary section of guest memory, the exit handler
re-sets the guest instruction pointer to the guest virtual ad-
dress of the instruction sequence and the guest register rBX
to the guest virtual address of the protected memory to be
read.
The diversion of guest control flow can be initiated at any
point during host execution. To resume normal guest execu-
tion after the attack, the guest registers which are clobbered
by the decryption are saved in the host environment and later
restored after the final memory element has been read.
Locating the Instruction Sequence The recent introduc-
tion of kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR)
complicates our attack. Now the instruction sequence can-
not simply be obtained from the guest kernel binary. Instead,
we only obtain the offset of the sequence within the kernel
text section via static analysis. The offset is then added to
the dynamic load address of the kernel text section, which
is randomly initialized during the boot process of the VM.
To compute the load address of the kernel text section, we
compare control registers exposed through the guest control
block, pointing to kernel functions inside the guest’s virtual
address space. Specifically, we subtract the virtual address
of the system call entry function entry SYSCALL 64 of the
running guest from the system call entry address of the non
randomized kernel image.
5.1.2 Disabling Memory Protection
In this section, we describe how encryption can be disabled
for individual guest memory pages or even for the complete
guest memory space. The attack is based on manipulation of
guest internal pagetable entries.
First, we will describe how we access those entries, even
though they are assumed to be located in private guest mem-
ory and thereby to be encrypted. To access pagetable en-
tries within the protected guest, we first read the physi-
cal pagetable address of the currently active process from
the cr3 register value stored in the vmcb. We then use the
method described in the previous section to read pagetable
entries from protected guest memory. As the read primitive
can only operate on guest virtual addresses, we access the
pagetable data via the direct physical memory map (referred
to as physmap). The physmap is a contiguous mapping of the
physical RAM into the virtual address space of the kernel.
The virtual base address of the physmap is stored in the ker-
nel variable page offset base which is located at a con-
stant offset from the dynamic load address of the kernel’s
text section. We use the read primitive with the adjusted off-
set of the page offset base variable to read its value from
guest memory. To access the pagetable entries, we add the
physical pagetable base address to the virtual base address
of the physmap. Using the write primitive, we are now able
to overwrite and add pagetable entries arbitrarily, using the
adjusted guest virtual address of the pagetable base as the
target location.
Even though we are now able to change the pagetable
bit controlling page encryption, clearing the C-bit from a
guest pagetable entry will only disable the transparent de-
or encryption on subsequent memory read or write accesses.
Thus the attacker is required to allocate new unprotected
(shared) pages of memory and to copy the protected (private)
data into the newly allocated areas.
Figure 3 gives an overview of how an attacker can deac-
tivate the protection of guest pages under an arbitrary guest
pagetable entry, without notifying the guest. The process can
be split up in two phases, first, duplication and then, replace-
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Figure 3: Pagetable Modification
ment. In the duplication phase, the protected data is trans-
ferred into newly allocated memory as seen in Figure 3a.
During the replacement phase, the guest pagetable entry
is modified to deactivate the protection, while the nested
pagetable entry is redirected to the new data, as shown in
Figure 3b.
Now to actually decrypt an amount of guest pages, the
according amount of pages has to be reserved in host mem-
ory. Then using the read primitive, the guest pagetables are
browsed for an unallocated slot matching the original entry
level. Similarly, an empty slot in the second level pageta-
bles is located. New pagetable entries are created from the
host physical, guest physical and guest virtual addresses.
The write primitive has to be used to add the entry con-
necting the guest virtual to the guest physical address in the
guest pagetables. Using the read primitive again, the pro-
tected guest memory is read and directly written into the
newly allocated area by the host. Finally, the pagetable entry
of the original protected mapping is modified to clear the C-
bit, while the nested pagetable entry is redirected to point to
the newly written data.
5.2 Attack based on Nested Pagetable Control
Systems that implement the optional SEV-ES feature will be
protected against the previously mentioned attacks. Based on
these revised security properties we construct a third attack,
which relies only on control over nested pagetable structures
and interrupt injection capabilities of the hypervisor. We
leave the detailed discussion about the necessity of the latter
two capabilities for guest transparent VM encryption in a
cloud environment to Section 6.
SEV-ES limits the hypervisor’s control over a guest.
Namely, the feature restricts access to the VM control block
and forces the encryption of guest general purpose registers
upon a vmexit. Here we explain the protection achieved
through deploying these mitigations to motivate the next at-
tack.
Limiting access to the VM control block prevents the ex-
ecution of the previous attacks on several levels. The leak-
age of kernel function pointers is prevented; therefore the
guest internal address mapping is not revealed. Whether an
instruction like hlt traps into host mode is controlled via
a bitmap contained in the vmcb. Therefore the number of
instruction sequences suitable for misuse as read and write
primitives can be limited by controlling the configuration of
this bitmap. Further, the capability of the hypervisor to ma-
nipulate guest control flow is restricted, as the instruction
pointer, which is also part of the vmcb, can be protected from
malicious modification. The encryption of guest control reg-
isters will handicap the application of read and write prim-
itives by impairing the control over the address of accessed
memory as well as the exposure of the decrypted data. We
argue that limiting hypervisor control over physical mem-
ory assignment would prevent memory overcommitment as
well as any dynamic load balancing or migration efforts. In
fact, we assume this capability to be crucial in a cloud en-
vironment. Comparably critical is the ability to inject virtual
interrupts for device virtualization.
We now describe how a malicious hypervisor can launch
a replay attack against a VM running in a protected environ-
ment, which uses the optional SEV-ES [4] feature in addition
to the protection mechanisms proposed by SEV [2].
First, we give a brief overview of replay attacks and
explain how we can attack an OpenSSH server running in
an unprotected guest by replaying login credentials. Next,
we describe how we can infer the correct location and time
to capture and replay guest memory without insight into the
guest memory content, by observing memory access and
system call patterns of the guest. Finally, we describe the
steps necessary to implement the attack against an encrypted
VM. We conclude with an evaluation of the presented attack.
5.2.1 Replay Attacks
On a high level, replay attacks exploit the lack of data ver-
sioning and authentication, which allows an attacker (in our
case a malicious hypervisor) to eavesdrop on the exchange
of valid authentication tokens and replay them to pose as the
original communication partner. For OpenSSH, we identi-
fied the function userauth passwd, shown abbreviated in
Listing 3, as a suitable target. In line 5 a password string is
read from the network buffer via packet get string and
stored on the stack. The password string is then validated at
line 9 by auth passwd. After validation, the password is
removed from memory at line 11.
To launch the attack against the OpenSSH server execut-
ing in a unencrypted guest, the hypervisor captures the guest
page containing the credential data in between lines 5 and 9.
The attacker then initiates a new connection. After the server
receives credentials from the attacker controlled client, the
hypervisor replaces the invalid credentials of the attacker,
with the data captured in the previous step. The validation
of the restored password will then succeed and thereby grant
access to the attacker controlled client at the privilege level
of the connecting user.
1 s t a t i c i n t u s e r a u t h p a s s w d ( A u t h c t x t ∗ a u t h c t x t ) {
2 char ∗password , ∗newpass ;
3 / / . . .
4 change = p a c k e t g e t c h a r ( ) ;
5 password = p a c k e t g e t s t r i n g (& l e n ) ;
6 / / . . .
7 i f ( change )
8 l o g i t ( ” password change n o t
s u p p o r t e d ” ) ;
9 e l s e i f ( PRIVSEP ( a u t h p a s s w o r d ( a u t h c t x t ,
password ) ) == 1)
10 a u t h e n t i c a t e d = 1 ;
11 memset ( password , 0 , l e n ) ;
12 x f r e e ( password ) ;
13 re turn a u t h e n t i c a t e d ;
14}
Listing 3: userauth passwd
5.2.2 Inferring Memory Content
In a classical replay scenario, the hypervisor can monitor
memory content to identify location and state of the memory
region to be captured and later replayed. If the guest memory
is encrypted, the main challenge is to infer those parameters
indirectly.
In this section, we describe how we identify when and
where to capture and later replay a memory page without in-
sight into its content. The key intuition behind our approach
is that memory content can be inferred through the access
patterns to individual pages, which we express through sys-
tem call sequences. First, we explain how we extract infor-
mation about system calls issued by the guest. Next, we de-
scribe how the sequence of system calls issued by the guest
is combined with the sequence of writes to guest memory
to identify the location of selected data structures as well as
their state.
Trapping System Calls into the Hypervisor To record a se-
quence of system calls issued by the guest we need a mech-
anism to trap into the hypervisor when a guest user process
tries to execute a system call. It is important to note that
we can extract system call information without access to the
guest register or control state. Instead, we remove the exe-
cute permissions on the guest memory page containing the
system call entry function entry SYSCALL 64 as well as the
pages containing the system call handler routines. Thereby
we enforce an exit to the hypervisor whenever system call
execution is initiated. By examining the fault address, the
hypervisor can determine which handler caused the fault.
Initially, only the system call entry page is protected; if a
vmexit is induced by guest execution of this page, we re-
strict access to the handler pages and restore execute permis-
sions on the entry page. Similarly, if a vmexit is induced by
guest execution of one of the handler pages we restore exe-
cute permissions to all handler pages while restricting access
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Figure 4: System Call Sequences on Guest Memory
to the entry page. This procedure is necessary, to enable the
re-execution of the faulting instruction in the guest.
To remove execute permission from guest pages contain-
ing the respective functions, we first need to locate them in
guest physical memory. Due to KASLR, the physical load
offset of the kernel text section is randomly initialized during
the VM boot process. We therefore employ a similar method
as described in Section 5.1.1 to adjust the guest physical ad-
dresses of the system call entry and handler functions ac-
cordingly. To obtain a point of reference from which to com-
pute the physical load offset of the kernel text section, the hy-
pervisor can trigger the immediate execution of known func-
tions, like interrupt handler routines, by the guest. By previ-
ously marking all guest memory pages as non executable
through the nested pagetables, the guest will immediately
fault, revealing the physical address of the triggered func-
tion through the fault metadata provided to the hypervisor.
The random physical load offset of the kernel text section
is then calculated by subtracting the fault address from the
physical address of the function, obtained from a non ran-
domized kernel image.
Combining System Call and Write Sequences Based on
the recorded system call sequence, the hypervisor can reason
about the state of guest execution. However, we still lack the
ability to identify which of the many guest memory pages
that are written continuously, contains the data selected for
replay. To that end, we cross-reference the sequence of guest
memory writes with the system call information by storing a
sequence of system calls for each page that preceded a write
access to the respective page.
We now explain our approach via a simplified example.
Figure 4 shows an excerpt of guest execution with two con-
current processes. The processes are identified by their ac-
cording cr3 values (either 1 or 2). Each process performs
a number of different system calls, whereas the most recent
one is highlighted in bold font. Guest pages are subsequently
marked with the system call identifier that was last recorded
before a write access occurred. To record those we intercept
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Figure 5: Nested Pagetable Modification
the guest on memory write access in addition to system call
execution. Upon a vmexit induced by execution of a system
call handler, we now also remove write permission from all
guest pages. Each subsequent write will now trap to the hy-
pervisor, where we firstly restore write permissions for the
respective page to allow for the re-execution of the faulting
instruction and secondly, mark the accessed page with the
last recorded system call identifier. On each memory write
we then evaluate these sequences for all guest pages to infer
whether a specific page currently contains the data selected
for replay.
5.2.3 Replay Attacks against Encrypted VMs
In this section we first describe the four phases composing
our replay attack, namely offline analysis, tracing, capture,
and replay. We then illustrate these steps by describing our
procedure to replay OpenSSH login credentials to gain ac-
cess to an encrypted VM at the privilege level of the con-
necting user.
Offline Analysis The first stage is an offline analysis of the
target application to determine possible replay attack vec-
tors. Currently, we do this manually and on a per-application
basis.
Tracing To determine the location of the credential data
structure in encrypted guest memory, we first trace system
call and memory access patterns of an unencrypted guest
running an identical OS and target application. This allows
us to scan the unencrypted guest memory for the selected
data continuously. If the selected data is detected in a guest
memory page, we store the respective access pattern. Due
to interrupts, scheduling and input from external sources,
execution paths and therefore system call sequences might
differ slightly. We account for this by collecting multiple
traces and simply extracting the longest trailing sequence
occurring in most of the traces. The sequence starts at the
syscall after which the memory is replayed. From there we
trace backward along all collected syscall sequences until
one of them diverges while discarding sequences whose
length falls under a predefined threshold.
Capture and Replay In the capture and replay phases, we
compare the collected sequence against those generated by
the encrypted guest. If the system call sequence of a guest
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Figure 6: Replay Attack Overview
page matches the reference we conclude that the encrypted
page contains the selected data and proceed to capture or
replay the contained data respectively.
In accordance with the encryption scheme described in
Section 4, the cipher text produced by the memory encryp-
tion algorithm is influenced not only by the content but also
by the host physical address of the memory page. Therefore
the replayed data has to be placed at the same host physical
address (HPA) as the captured data. This can be achieved by
manipulating the nested pagetables, which control the map-
ping of the guest physical address (GPA) to its HPA as shown
in Figure 5. In Figure 5a the guest memory page, containing
the valid credentials ”Correct Pass” has been identified for
capture. The nested pagetable entry connecting the GPA to
the HPA of this page is then modified to redirect the GPA
to a newly allocated page (Dummy). This removes the cap-
tured data from the guest’s address space so that it will not be
overwritten. During the replay phase described in Figure 5b
the nested pagetable is again modified to redirect the GPA
from the HPA containing the ”Wrong Pass” to the HPA of
the previously captured page still containing the ”Correct
Pass”. Using this method the minimum size of data that can
be replayed is a single page (usually 4KB), because the ad-
dress translation can be changed only on page granularity.
Figure 6 gives an overview of our replay attack. Here we
assume that offline analysis has already identified data and
state for capture and replay. We collect a reference sequence
of system calls (Trace Reference) for the page containing
the identified data, by initiating SSH password logins 1© to
an OpenSSH server running in an unencrypted guest (Ref-
erence Guest) with the same software configuration as the
target. Next, we wait for an incoming SSH client connection
to the protected guest (Target Guest) 2©, while continuously
comparing the access patterns of the protected guest (Target
Trace) against the reference. If an SSH client, authenticates
itself to the server via password, the page containing the
credential data structure (”Target Password”) is identified
and the content of the page is stored 3©. We then re-initiate
a password login to the protected guest from the attacker
controlled SSH client 4©. To grant access to the attacker
controlled client, the hypervisor modifies the nested paging
structures to redirect the page containing the invalid creden-
tials of the attacker (”Attacker Password”) to the stored page
5©.
5.2.4 Impact
To show the effectiveness of the replay attack, we evaluate
it by exploiting OpenSSH version 6.7p1-5+de running in a
VM. The test was conducted on a AMD Phenom II X4 965
processor with 4GB RAM. As the host operating system,
we used Linux with kernel version 4.4.0 and QEMU version
2.7.50 for communication with the KVM driver module.
For the evaluation, we disabled symmetric multiprocessing
on the host system. The guest was configured with 512MB
RAM and ran kernel version 4.9.0-rc5 with the full range of
KASLR options enabled. As AMD SEV is not available at
the time of this writing, we substitute an unencrypted VM
as our target. We argue that the results apply to a future real
SEV setup, because none of the data structures required for
the attack will be obscured even if SEV is enabled, according
to the currently available documentation.
The effectiveness of our attack is best classified by the
number of successful logins to the target guest that have to
be observed on average, before successful execution of the
described replay attack. The success rate hinges on the accu-
racy of page identification via system call and memory ac-
cess patterns as well as on the structure of the page selected
during offline analysis.
Page Structure We found that the offset of the credential
data within a memory page varies between four separate val-
ues. The distribution of the offset values is shown in Fig-
ure 7. To determine this distribution we initiated 387 SSH
password logins using a unique password to simplify the
identification of the page. By examining the collected traces,
we determined that the specific location cannot be extracted
from the system call access sequence. Further, we discovered
that replaying captured data over a page with mismatching
offset will terminate the guest process handling the login.
However, termination of the process spawned by the SSH
server to handle the connection will not impact the function-
ality of the guest, since it is immediately respawned by the
parent process. Unsuccessful replay attempts will require the
re-initiation of a new capture because the captured page was
mapped back into the guest’s memory space. Overwriting or
removing a mapped guest physical page will result in unpre-
dictable behaviour, unless the content of the page is known.
Trace Accuracy To improve the coverage of guest execu-
tion paths and thereby the trace accuracy we collect multiple
system call sequences. From those, we extract the sequence
of system call identifiers that identifies the greatest number
of the collected traces correctly. To measure the trace ac-
curacy, we collected 387 traces to compute the reference se-
quence. We then proceeded to initiate 2155 SSH connections
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to the VM and matched the generated traces against the ref-
erence. To verify the correct identification of the page, we
choose a unique string as the password and tested whether
the guest page identified by the reference sequence con-
tained this string and whether the data structure of the page
matched the data structure of page selected for replay. The
achieved identification accuracy for the page containing the
credential data was 86%. We encountered no false positives
during our test, which is important because the remapping
of a falsely identified guest page during capture will most
likely have an adverse effect on the guest.
Success Rate To measure the overall success rate, we com-
pare the number of observed valid logins against the number
of times, the attacker was granted access to the system. To
that end, we run two identical VMs (reference and target)
and extract a reference sequence from 387 observed logins
to the reference VM. While using this reference to identify
the password data in the target VM’s memory, we initiated
2155 SSH password logins with valid login credentials to the
target VM. This resulted in 505 successful replays; therefore
the success rate of the attack is 23%. The result is consistent
with the measurements of data location distribution and trace
accuracy. Especially the variation of credential offsets within
a memory page limits the possible success rate to maximally
25%. However we argue that this factor can be alleviated by
a more thorough investigation of the target software stack,
to identify data structures suited for replay, with less varying
location offsets.
6. Discussion
In the previous sections we laid out the details how a ma-
licious hypervisor can exploit design issues in AMD’s up-
coming Secure Encrypted Virtualization technology to a) to
gain access to a guest, b) to read encrypted guest memory
and c) to fully revert any memory encryption configured by
the tenant.
In this chapter, we discuss possible mitigations to these
threats and evaluate their projected impact on performance
and usability.
6.1 Mitigations
Pure software changes can not eliminate the design issues
discussed in Section 3. To thwart the attacks presented here
we propose the following design changes for future versions
of SEV:
• Encrypted general purpose registers
• No access to the vmcb after an initial configuration
• Memory protection against hypervisor access
While the presented mitigations against the first two at-
tacks induce a bearable degradation of guest transparency
and performance, the replay attack remains difficult to miti-
gate given these demands.
Access to general purpose registers The general purpose
registers must never be visible to the hypervisor as they leak
sensitive guest data on any vmexit. A guest does not have
control over exits to the hypervisor, thus the encryption of
general purpose registers must be enforced by the hardware.
The encryption imposes another difficulty as certain guest
operations require the hypervisor to read the general purpose
registers. For example, when the guest writes data to a virtual
device, this memory access will trap into the hypervisor. If
the instruction causing the trap takes the value to write from
a register, the hypervisor which is attempting to emulate
the access, will not be able to read it when the general
purpose registers are encrypted. The vmcb must be extended
to contain decode assists for these events to provide the
required information. As indicated in [21] decode assists
are already in place to allow the hypervisor to read the
instruction causing a vmexit. For future versions of SEV,
these assists must be extended to contain the register values
that hold the arguments to the instruction. The system must
only augment vmexit events caused by traps to shared pages
with these decode assists, in order to ensure that a malicious
hypervisor cannot force a guest to reveal register content
through decode assists.
Access to the vmcb Usually, the vmcb is configured only
once during the initial setup while at runtime a benign hyper-
visor does not need to modify the vmcb, with some excep-
tions. The fact that SEV allows us to alter the vmcb neverthe-
less imposes a security risk as it permits us to divert the con-
trol flow of guest by setting an arbitrary instruction pointer.
We propose to change the existing state caching mechanism
to enable the creation of a write-once vmcb. Currently, the
content of the vmcb is already cached to improve context
switch performance. The CPU is permitted to use the cached
values of the vmcb unless the hypervisor explicitly clears bits
in a special vmcb area called vmcb clean field and thereby
forces the CPU to reread vmcb data. By prohibiting the hy-
pervisor from altering this field, the CPU is always able to
use the cached values. At the first start of a guest the CPU
copies the hypervisor provided vmcb into the cache. During
runtime, the system always uses the cached vmcb. The ini-
tial vmcb can be assumed trustworthy because it is taken into
account for the remote attestation. If the hypervisor wants to
schedule another guest, hence another vmcb must be loaded,
the system must provide a way to store the cached vmcb en-
crypted in shared memory.
However, there are elements in the vmcb which the hyper-
visor must be able to modify at runtime. Most importantly,
injecting virtual interrupts into a VM requires the modifi-
cation of several fields, among them V IRQ, V INTR PRIO,
V INTR MASKING and V INTR VECTOR. Efficient injection
of multiple pending interrupts also requires access to the
EVENTINJ field and the VINTR bit in the generic instruc-
tion intercept selection bitmask. These elements would ei-
ther have to be excluded from our proposed “mandatory
caching” scheme, or AMD’s interrupt controller virtualiza-
tion (AVIC) could be declared as a dependency of SEV thus
making those vmcb elements obsolete.
Access to guest memory Writes by the untrusted hypervi-
sor to guest memory are dangerous. The fact that no mem-
ory authentication is in use opens the door for fault injection
and replay attacks as presented in this paper. The most com-
mon way to protect memory from unauthorized access are
integrity trees. However, they induce a notable performance
and memory space overhead [23]. In a more relaxed attack
model where physical attacks such as bus intercepts or di-
rect memory accesses are not considered, it is sufficient to
prevent the hypervisor from writing encrypted guest mem-
ory using mechanisms such as CIP as presented in [24]. The
exclusion of pages from hypervisor access requires nontriv-
ial changes to the guest operation system as well as the hy-
pervisor. Further, the proposed access restrictions impact or
even prohibit major cloud maintenance operations like snap-
shotting or live migration. Intel’s SGX technology uses both
encryption and integrity checks to protect the memory of en-
claves [15]. However, SGX enclaves are small compared to
VMs, and it is thus still an open question whether protecting
the memory of complete VMs by integrity trees is feasible.
7. Related Work
In the following section, we present some topics which are
relevant to this work.
7.1 Attacks
While attacks against AMD’s SEV have not been published,
several attacks against similar systems have been proposed.
Checkoway et al. [6] proposed an attack method dubbed Iago
whereby a malicious kernel manipulates system call return
values to mount arbitrary code execution attacks on a system
that protects userland applications from a malicious kernel.
This work clearly shows that it is important to secure the
system call interface from an adversary. Linux system calls
can be identified by a unique number that is stored in the
general purpose registers. As these registers are still subject
to manipulation by a hypervisor, this type of attack is also
applicable to AMD SEV.
Xu et al. [28] showed how secret data can be extracted
by inferring from page faults that specific execution paths
inside a protected SGX enclave were executed. Using these
execution traces, they were able to reconstruct images that
were processed inside this enclave. Their approach of infer-
ring memory content based on pagetable fault information
is similar to the approach used in the proposed replay at-
tack. SGX however does not hide the process internal ad-
dress mapping from the attacker, which allows for a much
more direct method of inference. Further, they did not deal
with multiple concurrent processes.
Weichbrodt et al. proposed an attack dubbed AsyncShock
[26]. They exploit the fact that the operating system is re-
sponsible for scheduling SGX enclave threads. By forcing
enclave exits during the execution of multithreaded enclave
code, they were able to mount use-after-free and TOCTTOU
attacks on SGX protected enclaves.
Similar to our replay attack, Branco et al. [5] exploit the
lack of memory authentication to compromise an encrypted
system. The compromise is accomplished by injecting faults
into critical state areas of the login process via the JTAG
interface.
7.2 Defenses
Protecting applications from higher privileged software has
been the subject of research for a long time. Many solu-
tions that target single applications were proposed such as
[7, 8, 14, 22]. Many of these solutions assume the existence
of a trusted hypervisor to enforce protection of single appli-
cations or parts of an application.
A different direction is explored in the publications [17,
24, 24, 29]. The goal of their research is to provide protec-
tion mechanisms that ensure the integrity and confidentiality
of the guest even in the case of a compromised hypervisor.
Zhang et al. proposed CloudVisor [29] where a trusted secu-
rity manager provides protection of guest VMs by means of
nested virtualization. In contrast, Seongwook et al. proposed
H-SVM [17], a purely hardware-based mechanism to protect
guest systems. The guest memory is not mapped into the hy-
pervisor context and a new hardware component, H-SVM,
is controlling the nested pagetable. The hypervisor cannot
access guest memory as it cannot create mappings itself, be-
cause the nested pagetables are protected. H-SVM protects
the guest state by setting aside a dedicated memory area that
is also not accessible by the hypervisor. If the hypervisor
needs to access guest memory, the corresponding page must
be explicitly marked by the guest. Physical attacks are not
considered by H-SVM.
Similarly, Szefer et al. presented HyperWall [24]. Instead
of removing the hypervisor’s ability to manage the nested
pagetable, an additional protection mechanism is introduced:
Confidentiality and Integrity Protection tables, short CIP.
These tables are consulted by the MMU when accessing
memory.
Xia et al [27] followed this path with HyperCoffer and
added protection against physical attacks by using encrypted
memory with integrity checks. In this later publication they
also address the lack of support for common cloud main-
tenance operations, like live migration or VM snapshotting
and restoration.
8. Future Work
After the initial publication of this paper, AMD released a
new version of their Programmer’s Manual [4]. The updated
version details a new set of features called SEV-ES, which
encrypts the guest state and enables the guest to finely con-
trol which state to share with the hypervisor. Therefore the
first two attacks described in 1 are only effective against sys-
tems without SEV-ES support. Further research is needed to
examine which attack vectors, besides replay, remain despite
the proposed mechanisms.
While we clearly show, that SEV and SEV-ES cannot of-
fer protection against a malicious hypervisor, we are confi-
dent that those technologies will thwart a substantial amount
of attacks that rely on fewer capabilities. The question to
what extend less severe hypervisor bugs, which do not lead
to a complete compromise, but rather cause data leakage or
allow to rewrite the memory of another VM impact the con-
fidentiality and integrity of the tenant’s data, has yet to be
examined.
9. Conclusion
This paper presents a first security evaluation of the upcom-
ing Secure Encrypted Virtualization technology by AMD.
While there are no actual CPUs available yet, the official
documents published by AMD give away design issues that
can be exploited by a malicious hypervisor.
By implementing three proof-of-concept attacks, we showed
that these issues can be exploited to fully circumvent the
protection mechanisms introduced by SEV. Furthermore, we
showed that even when the hypervisor is not able to control
the guest using the vmcb and general purpose registers, the
control over the nested pagetable combined with the abil-
ity to inject interrupts is enough to mount a replay attack.
We proposed possible hardware extensions to mitigate our
attacks and compared similar solutions presented by the sci-
entific community. Although we discovered serious design
issues of AMD’s SEV, we still think that the technology is
promising considering the mitigations discussed in this pa-
per.
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